

Vaiṣṇava Vedānta

Mahanamabrata Brahmachari



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VAIṢṆAVA VEDĀNTA

(The Philosophy of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī)

By

MAHANAMABRATA BRAHMACHARI

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“Philosophies are intimate parts of the universe.
They express something of its own thought of itself.”

—William James

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Dedicated
To
The Lotus feet of my
Spiritual Preceptor
ŚRĪ ŚRĪPĀD MAHENDRAJĪ
who preached Mahānāma
as did
NITYĀNANDA

FOREWORD

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ŚRĪ JĪVA ĠOSWĀMI

(By Śrī Mahānāmaabrata Brahmachāri)

A very well-known verse in the Bhagavad-Gītā utters—‘Code’ words—Jnātum, Draṣṭum, Praveṣṭum—for the seeker who aspires to be ushered into the innermost sanctuary of the Temple of Truth. “Know, See and Enter” render in common terms the three code words. But common terms can commonly touch only the fringe of what is uncommonly vast and deep in significance. They do not make it clear for instance why the words are given in that order and not in any other which appears to be more sensible and natural from our common appreciative standpoint. Why not—Enter, See and Know, for example? In the few words that follow, it is likely that a possible clue to an answer may be found; but, to begin with, we may say—categorically that the order in which the words have come from the Lips Divine is the order in which the Philosophy of Śrī Jīva has opened the ‘mystery locks’ one after another and ushered us into the Hṛt and Hṛllekhā—the inmost ‘core’ and ‘core picture’ of Ultimate Reality (Parama Tattva). First, *know* that the whole cosmic order has no being, no activity and no power separate from and independent of the Supreme Reality; then, *See* that its being is not ‘brute’ and blind unconsciousness, but is the Pure Plenum of Consciousness itself; and finally, *enter* into the core essence of Consciousness itself, which is Ānanda or Rasa.

The brightest star or the meanest straw outside, the sublimest sentiment and thought or the merest freak and fancy in the mind, when interrogated, will lead me to the three locked doors one after another, and ask me to find a key to try each one with, and open if I can. First of all, I am to *know* as it ‘looks’, and also its behaviour and relation to other objects. The method is mainly ‘out-door’ and objective, though it may relate to what are called subjective phenomena. I thus gather much information which when brought to a system and presented as a rounded whole, is called my Science. But the information, though cogent and instructive in the context of a space-time representation, touches only the outer fringes of the problem of substance, origin and

causation. In other words, it does not tell me what the thing in its essence or reality is ; nor does it enlighten me as to *where* it has ultimately come from, or truly *how* and *why*.

When we inspect a distant star through a telescope or a tiny living cell or a crystal under a microscope, we have to 'see' in order to know. But this is outwardly directed seeing ; so is the seer and so is his instrument. It is out-door reviewing and reporting. This is followed no doubt by calculations, comparisons and more or less sensible guesses as to the nature and manner of the objects and their behaviour. But both Truth and Reality as regards fundamentals recede and elude as the net is knit closer and its sweep made wider in our objective theories. Not only so ; our vision beyond the Milky Way has blurred and blinded true insight into the heart and core of things ; the colossal genie released from the 'sealed vase' of matter has made us feel so abysmally helpless and 'powerless' now as we never felt before.

So we have to turn round and 'evolve' a new way and technique of 'seeing'. We have to knock at an inner door, where Ātman, the indwelling Spirit, resides. We have to 'face' the Self within, and ask it to give us back the Light that has been confounded and lost in the mirage outside ; and also the Power that we have forfeited in the rupture and capture of power outside. It is Self that reveals and reassures that being or existence is consciousness (Cit) ; that movement has no intrinsic meaning without life (Prāṇa) that 'throbs and breathes' in us ; that power or energy has no ultimate significance without Cit-Sakti that wills, urges and impels in us. And what is even more vital—it is the Self that shows beyond doubt that existence is the expression of Basic Joy (Ānanda), and the fundamental mode of its expression is spontaneous everflowing as play. In short, it is by Self's own revelation that we are assured of the identity of Asti-Bhāti-Priyam, Being-Consciousness-Joy.

Without this inalienable 'home' guarantee and assurance, both our Science and Philosophy are sure to come to grief in their 'foreign' expeditions and explorations. Philosophy which is and ought to be the love of Wisdom, will develop a tendency and habit to close her office when she thinks she has docketed and summarised the findings of Science ; she will look askance at such home 'helpers' as introspection, intuition and so on, which found favour with the a-priori school. Kant said that it was Hume who

had roused him from his dogmatic slumber. But there is dogmatism in avoiding dogmatism, and the 'Self-exiled' dogmatism of the so-called realistic and positivistic philosophies is the 'Serbonian Bog' where the abiding values of life and existence have sunk. So the exile must now be shown the way to come home—back to what is inalienably and unquestionably his own—his Svadhāma, Svabhāva. If a 'neutral stuff' with no intrinsic consciousness and joy and freedom be your starting premise, or a merely mathematical Space-Time Continuum, then, by your laws of statistical probability, a Supreme Cold and Callous Neutrality, devoid of grace and love, will, as likely (or more likely), be your 'emergent' conclusion as a Sovereign Deity of bliss and benevolence.

So we must look and 'see' within for a definite promise and positive sanction as regards the highest values. Now, if by doing so we find that existence has no sense without consciousness, movement has no 'momentum' without that consciousness being dynamic as life as will, and further, if both existence and life are devoid of soul, of creative interest and consummating fulfilment, without Joy overflowing and expressing itself as love and play, then we feel realize that our 'seeing' has neither missed the Way nor miscarried us. The Way does not take us to a realm of dreary or dubious values. The world we live in and we ourselves are manifestations of a Divine Consciousness and Will. As Rāmānuja taught—all, cit or acit, sentiment or not, make His 'Body' of which He is the Indwelling Soul and Spirit. May we call Him Paramātmā, as He is the Archetype of the Ātman in us and its Lord ? The Philosophy of Sri Jīva fully keeps company with us so far on the Way. But the Way really begins here with Him and not ends. The wayfarer still lives on a mixed nourishment—Karma, Jñāna and Bhakti ; though stress is laid on the last as the main. But where is his pure Annam or Amṛtam to be found ? In pure Jyotiḥ (Light) or in pure Rasa (Delight) ? Is it to be pure Illumination and Peace absolute, or Joy perfect in its richness of theme, rhyme and measure ?

To abstract thought, this confronts us with a dialectic dilemma. If Being-Consciousness-Joy with all the infinite richness of its significance in content and relation, theme and rhyme, movement and measure, is to be maintained even at the fundamental levels, then 'pure' (formless, attributeless, functionless) Being and so forth must be discarded as an unreal abstraction sought to be hypostatized by Sankara and his school ; if, on the other hand,

such pure Being etc. (Suddha Asti-Bhāti-Priyam) be regarded as the unchallenged Ultimate Reality, then not only the passing show of the name and form, but even all the abiding Values of our love and yearning, endeavour and achievement, can have a secondary and subordinate, conventional and conditional reality. Now, if Sankara's position be the thesis, that of Rāmānuja will be its antithesis.

Srī Jīva's Philosophy which 'sees' the Supreme Reality as Bhagavān—par excellence, the God of Love and Līlā—is naturally more inclined to the antithesis of Rāmānuja than to the thesis of Sankara ; but it claims that by seeing 'deeper', it has found a 'silken cord' and a mantram by which the two 'poles' can be brought together and joined, so to say, in a happy wedlock. Pure Asti-Bhāti-Priyam is an unquestionable deliverance of one who has sought the fundamental Background (Adhiṣṭhāna) of all experience ; it is also the undeniable Plenum (Ākāśa-Paramākāśa, Cidākāśa, Ānandākāśa) in which all existence, mundane or supermundane, 'lives, moves and has its being'. Srī Jīva's Philosophy cannot dismiss this as only transcendental abstraction. After the analogy of the Sun, it may be thought that Bhagavān, Who 'at His Core' is Ānanda and Rasa, cannot be separated from His Own infinite pure Radiance (Suddha Bhāti), nor from the unbounded immensity of His Own pure Dominion (Suddha Asti). The Brahman of the Upanishads is His 'Tanubhāh', Kaviraj Goswami would say.

We cannot enlarge upon this, but the Book of which this is to be a Preface has admirably dealt with a dialectic dilemma. Be it borne in mind that it is the call of what we 'see' that has landed us in this dialectic pass. To Kant it was Pure Reason. To get out of the *impasse*, Kant had to try and enter by another door, Practical Reason. So here to find a point of sympathetic contact and cordial concord, we must open and unfold 'seeing' in what we may call its 'third' dimension, by which it may enter into the Hṛt and Hṛllekhā, not only of things on this mundane plane (Prākṛta), but also of the Pure Ideas of Being-Consciousness-Joy, in the transcendental altitude of Ākāśa where all differentiations are lost. This we may characterize as the Altitude or Vertical dimension as contrasted with the Prākṛta which relates to 'this' plane of our—of Aparā prakṛti—including orders of relative change and stability (Kṣara and Kṣarākṣara). The Altitude dimension aims at the Akṣara-parama—the Unchanging Absolute.

It is the Parā Prakṛti—supra or sublimating Self in us that so aims, and may also reach the End. Jīva realizes himself as Brahman. But if by the way of devotion and love, the third dimension also opens, he is ushered into the Parama Prakṛti of Bhagavān Puruṣottama, Who is both transcendent and superior to the contrasted orders of change and no-change. The third 'eye' is then the 'eye' of the heart's aspiration, love and surrender. And it is this that opens God's Own Realm or Dhāma.

All creation without beginning or end is His dominion, where His majesty reigns and rules the unruly, it becomes His 'Kingdom' to the 'faithful flock' ; it becomes His Temple and Shrine to the devotee ; but it is to His lover alone that it becomes His Own 'Home' and 'Bower'—'Goloka' or 'Vṛndāvana'. In this Home or Līlā-bhūmi of His, the core quintessence of all being and becoming, conscious and enjoying, is to be sought and found. All sublimated human relations and emotions are consummated in this Realm of Platonic archetypal purity, with this vital addition that the consummation proceeds for and ever from sweeter to still sweeter novelty, charm and fascination. And in order that this may be so, Bhagavān projects from His Svarūpa-Sakti Yogamāyā, Who bids His 'Majesty' to 'retire', so that His Sweetness may 'play' alone with His beloved. His Flute shall call, enchant and enthral, and not His Thunder shall roar, awe and appal. As we have said in our Japasūtram, Yogamāyā is what renders His Svalasita Ānanda 'Vilasta'—the Play of Līlā. (Vide Japasūtram, Vol. III, Sutras 17, 18, 19, 20=I. Adhyāya, IV, Pada.)

The God of Love is not 'content' with His retirement in Goloka and enact the Play that His Yogamāyā prepares for Him. It is Madhura Līlā with Nitya Rūpa and Nāma, and it continues and grows from eternity to eternity, in unending variations in theme and rhyme, movement and measure. The God of Love yearns for descending into this deluded world of ours of bondage and suffering, because it is the nature of love to overflow, to endear and embrace. Peace desires to be left alone ; love desires communion, concourse and company. So love incarnates.

The world today is not only a deluded and confounded world, but very nearly 'promises' to be a doomed world. So it hath need of Thee, O God of Love and Mercy !

I had known Srī Mahānāma by his name and fame before I saw him, a few years ago. It was an intuitive heart attraction

first with me. Then as we 'saw' each other closer, many kindred points of intellectual contact stood out in relief as regards matters fundamental ; and what is more vital, we both discovered more notes of concord in our deeper heart-beats. I met him in his inimitable discourses on Śrīmad Bhāgavatam and also on Śrī Śrī Candī. We also met in soul to soul and heart to heart talks. In the former, what impressed me deeply was the unique freshness of his view-point, the depth as well as the breadth of his line of approach, the compact reasonableness of his analysis, and the lucid and logical mode of his presentation. As regards our private Sanga, what appealed to and attracted me most was his humility and love which would lay aside all name and fame, and seek light and blessing from 'all and sundry'. This was as I saw Mahānāma in his comparatively maturer days. The present book has been written several years earlier as his thesis for an American doctorate. The book bears the stamp and impress of the Mahānāma I 'saw' later. It is comprehensive and comparative ; *synthetic in its summing-up ; logical in its analysis ; lucid in its expression.* Many a congenial stream of lore and wisdom from the East and the West has been brought to a happy confluence here, where the reader who aspired to 'see' and 'enter' can bathe for stimulating light and delight. May the Lord bless us !

Pausa Sankrānti
1367 Bengali era

Swāmī Pratyagātmānanda Sarasvatī

ŚRĪ JĪVA GOSVĀMĪ

[Glimpses of life]

Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī was born in Rāmkeli situated near the kingdom of Hussen Shāh, the then king of Gaurh (Bengal) most probably between 1530 and 1540 A.D. His father was Anupama alias Ballavadeva, the younger brother of India-famous Rūpa and Sanātana, the two high officials under Hussen Shāh and later on, the two pillars of Vaiṣṇava-movement of Chaitanya. Anupama, the father of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī, too, was a high official under Hussen Shāh.

Śrī Jīva inherited not the huge wealth of the royal family but the invaluable spiritual treasure of his parents and two uncles, Rūpa and Sanātana. He lost his father in his childhood.

After the resignation of Rūpa and Sanātana from worldly life and death of Anupama, the family lost its glamour of wealth and social status. Thereafter, Śrī Jīva was brought to Chandradwipa in the District of Barisal (now in Bangladesh). Śrī Jīva had to live there with his mother in a lonely big old palace. Śrī Jīva's mother was a very pious lady and orthodox in performing the rituals in the day long. Basically a Bhakta of Mahāprabhu Śrī Chaitanya, she did not forget to narrate the details of the glorious lives of the trio — Rūpa, Sanātana and Anupama — to her son, as a result, the boy Śrī Jīva grew while playing with mates, with deepest respect for his parents and uncles and a zest for a life of other worldly happiness.

Śrī Jīva was an extraordinarily brilliant and a handsome boy of pleasing and charming personality, — and as a result, was loved by all. At the age of only twenty (within a very short span of time indeed !), Śrī Jīva completed the studies of Sanskrit grammar and other primary courses of vast Sanskrit language. From the very boyhood days Śrī Jīva was docile, indifferent and introvert ; his eyes were fixed on the horizon ; he was a born denizen of the deep and a citizen of an utterly different world. At this age of twenty Śrī Jīva determined to renounce the worldly life and to follow the footprints of his uncles, Rūpa-Sanātana. With an intention of higher studies Śrī Jīva left for Navadwipa, the then

Oxford of India. On the way he dressed himself as a conventional Vaiṣṇava monk and reached Navadvīpa to meet Nityānanda, the right hand of Chaitanya Mahāprabhu and the embodiment of forgiveness, kindness and faith. Śrī Jīva left home for ever.

In Navadvīpa he was most welcomed by Vaiṣṇavas and was introduced to Nityānanda Mahāprabhu; Nityānanda embraced Śrī Jīva with deep affection and readily recognized him as the future leader of Vaiṣṇavism and founder of theoretical basis of Chaitanya-cult. His joy knew no bounds; Nityānanda was Śrī Jīva's guide and showed him every nook and corner of Navadvīpa — the sacred site of Mahāprabhu Śrī Chaitanya. Then Nityānanda Mahāprabhu sent Śrī Jīva to Banaras for the studies of Vedānta and other higher treatises of Indian philosophy.

Śrī Jīva reached Banaras — the greatest centre of Sanskrit culture in India for ages, and went to Madhusudana Vāchaspati — the then best scholar of Vedānta and the most favourite disciple of Vāsudeva Sārbabhauma, another famous scholar of Vedānta and later on a staunch follower and devotee of Mahāprabhu. The Vāchaspati admitted him as his student and gave him lessons on Vedānta. Within a very short span of time Śrī Jīva had the loftiest academic attainment. Soon he became famous in Banaras as a scholar of uncommon talent. He acquired great proficiency in all schools of philosophic thought known at that time in India. Also he became well versed in the vast lore of sacred literatures.

After finishing his studies, Śrī Jīva went to Vrindāvan — the sacred place of divine sports of Lord Śrī Kṛṣṇa, the dreamland of the Vaiṣṇavas of all time. Śrī Jīva rubbed the golden dust of Vrindāvan on his forehead; the fond tales of Kṛṣṇa's sports with cowboys and gopīs captivated his imagination at this romantic perspective; Śrī Jīva observed the sublime beauty of the dancing blue waves of the river Jamunā under the azure, the green wood, the flowers, the birds; the Bhakta reached his abode Vrindāvan — Vrindāvan got her true inhabitant — the *Emperor* of Bhaktas and Bhakti.

Śrī Jīva met his uncles. They embraced their affectionate Śrī Jīva — the only son of their family, who in time would be the only heir of their spiritual wealth and kingdom of Bhakti. Śrī Jīva gradually became acquainted with all the fellow travellers on the way, the dwellers of Vrindāvan — the Messiahs in the world. All became highly pleased with his scholarship, simplicity,

renunciation and determination and blessed him from the core of their heart.

Śrī Jīva began the new chapter of his life. Rūpa set the ideals and gave the initiation, Sanātana and Raghunātha provided the support and encouragement of kindred soul. Śrī Jīva began Sādhanā (religious practice) — the practice of blossoming of self and realizing the 'Sat-Chit-Ānanda', with keenness and determination. Soon he became an expert on Vaiṣṇava theology. The spiritual wealth and experience of Rūpa and Sanātana was added to the inborn talent of Śrī Jīva.

This was the golden age of Vrindāvan. She soon became famous with her galaxy of saints and scholars. Students and scholars from different parts of the country began to come there seeking instructions, knowledge, spiritual guidance and discussion and debate on different issues.

There was a popular practice amongst the Indian scholars in those days that a scholar wishing to establish himself as the best scholar could invite other scholars in a debate. The defeated one used to admit the winner's victory in black and white. Rūpa Gosvāmī, the then leader of Vaiṣṇava scholars of Vraja would never accept such invitation from any Proud *Scholar*; he was rather used to admit the supremacy of the scholar in writing without any debate and hesitation. Rūpa, a rare combination of a philosopher and a poet, fully blossomed beyond his ego in the love and light of Kṛṣṇa and a dweller of mystic world, was usually underestimated by the Proud Scholars. But Śrī Jīva knew the vastness of scholarship of Rūpa and he became aggrieved to see that the most substandard egoistic scholars underestimated Rūpa. This was unbearable to him, but he could do nothing before his master. When Śrī Jīva found such pedants in the absence of Rūpa, he used to teach them good lessons; and they were astomished at the sparkling talent of Śrī Jīva. This attempt of Śrī Jīva caused a melodramatic incident in his life. When Rūpa Gosvāmī was composing his celebrated book 'Bhakti Rasāmṛita Sindhu', Śrī Jīva was his greatest help in this work; a south-Indian Vaiṣṇava preacher (Vallava Bhatta) came to Vrindāvan and expressed his willingness to read 'Bhakti Rasāmṛita Sindhu'. Rūpa welcomed him and read out from his book. Śrī Jīva was nearby. Vallava Bhatta talked about some mistakes committed by Rūpa. Both Śrī Jīva and Rūpa knew that they were correct, and Vallava was

wrong; still Rūpa, being a true exponent of Vaiṣṇavism and egolessness, immediately conceded to it. But as soon as Rūpa went out of the cottage, Śrī Jīva invited the conceited man and immediately disappointed him by his superhuman talent. Ballava understood that his arguments were baseless and became ashamed of his ignorance and action before such scholars. He immediately went to Rūpa to repent for his action. Rūpa understood that Śrī Jīva was responsible for it and became highly displeased to see that Śrī Jīva was not behaving properly like a true Vaiṣṇava. A real Vaiṣṇava, in his estimation, should have forbearance, or perfect indifference even to irreparable loss or unexpected gain in worldly affairs, no desire for public esteem and should feel himself as the worst of all, though perhaps, the best. Knowledge is for intellectual conviction and firmness of devotion, and not for material gain whatsoever.

But what Śrī Jīva was doing? ... Rūpa Gosvāmī took stern measure to rectify their loving Śrī Jīva and scolded him severely and ordered him to leave Vrajadhām immediately, because Śrī Jīva had not yet acquired the citizenship of that place.

Śrī Jīva realized his mistakes in his heart of hearts; egoism, pride, name and fame, and other passions are the rocks where a Vaiṣṇava monk may be shipwrecked. So, Śrī Jīva determined to purge himself of egoism and entered a deep forest, built a hut and decided to offer himself in the pure flame of the immortal (āhuti) — total and unconditional — complete replacement of the ego by Kṛiṣṇa's will. By virtue of his total renunciation and pure devotion, Śrī Jīva's whole being was set on fire with the love of Kṛiṣṇa. Śrī Jīva passed day and night by chanting the name of Hari with the firm belief in his heart that Kṛiṣṇa would be merciful. He was completely indifferent to his body which dwindled down gradually. Because of that extreme Sādhanā, Jīva's whole being underwent a total transformation; his whole self was divinised. He got Bhakti — the concrete love of living manifestation of God and became a Bhakta — an associate of Kṛiṣṇa and a true citizen of Vrindāvan.

Rūpa Gosvāmī, after banishing Śrī Jīva, was not passing his days happily. It was very difficult to replace a disciple like Jīva — his right hand in composing 'Bhakti Rasāmrita Sindhu'.

Sanātana knew the story of Śrī Jīva's Sādhanā and Rūpa's feeling of separation from Śrī Jīva. At his request and information, Rūpa condoned Śrī Jīva who had already been a new man;

the re-union was happy. Rūpa presented his dearest idol (Vigraha) of Kṛiṣṇa to Śrī Jīva. Śrī Jīva worshipped the holy idol as the manifestation of Supreme Reality — "Archāvatāra" according to Rāmānuja. This holy idol is still lying in Jaypur.

After a few years Rūpa and Sanātana, and other Vaiṣṇava apostles left this mundane plane, and the leadership of Vaiṣṇava movement fell on the shoulder of Śrī Jīva. The Āśrama was now his, and he had to take the responsibility of being a Guru — the beginning of a new Dharma (duty) and appearance of new Karma (work) — a new man had come to birth. It was his mission then to induce people to turn their mind to Kṛiṣṇa.

Śrī Jīva was not only a scholar-monk but also a good administrator and organiser. He sent throughout the country a trained group of Vaiṣṇava monks to propagate Vaiṣṇava theology and philosophy and to give a systematic process of Sādhanā to the common man. He established a big library of old Sanskrit literature in Vrindāvan. He managed for the first time to collect paper from the Moghul capital for easy copying and propagation of Vaiṣṇava literature. It was due to his ardent effort and desire that King Mansingh constructed the Temple of Govindajī in Vrindāvan.

Along with his constructive and organisational work, he maintained his literary and intellectual activity. He composed a number of books which placed the Chaitanya-cult for the first time on a philosophical basis with a systematized process of Sādhanā (religious practice) and well-defined goal. The major work of Śrī Jīva is known as 'Ṣat Sandarbha', which means six treatises on philosophy. They are as follows:

1. Tattva Sandarbha (Discourses on Truth)
2. Bhāgavata Sandarbha (Discourses on God)
3. Paramātma Sandarbha (Discourses on the Absolute)
4. Bhakti Sandarbha (Discourses on Devotion)
5. Prīti Sandarbha (Discourses on Love)
6. Kṛiṣṇa Sandarbha (Discourses on the Lord Kṛiṣṇa)

Besides these writings, he has left about a dozen of minor works. His best work is the 'Bhāgavata Sandarbha' — which placed him in the assembly of great philosophers of the world.

There is a great good deal of difference of opinion among the philosophers regarding the relation between the jīva (monads) and Brahman. In one view, there is no difference whatsoever; in another view, there is; and yet in a third view, there are both — difference (bheda) and non-difference (abheda).

Śrī Jīva established that God is Personal, and the relation between jīva and Brahman is one of “achinyta-bhedābheda” (inexplicable difference and non-difference). By “achintya” he means ‘incapable of being considered under either of the categories of absolute difference and absolute non-difference’ — as in the case of fire and heat. This is known as the “Achintya-Bhedābheda-vāda” (theory of inexplicable difference and non-difference) of Bengal School. The Bhakti-cult or Vaiṣṇavism based on the doctrine of “Grace” and germinated from the Upaniṣads which announce that “the Self cannot be realized by the study of the Vedas, nor by intelligence, nor by deep learning ; It can be realized by him only whom It chooses or favours, to him the Self reveals Its own nature” — was developed into a full-grown system of Philosophy and Theology of its own. The Upaniṣads call Him Rasa, the most relishable and Ānanda (absolute bliss) being the essence of Brahman. Vaiṣṇavism could not remain satisfied with inert impersonal Brahman but converted Him to Personal God. Śrī Jīva’s work made a thorough synthesis of the Upaniṣadic thought sporadically segregated with apparently contradictory ideas but intrinsically inclined towards a doctrine of a blissful absolute reality, Ānanda or Rasa-Brahma. Now it is our duty to understand and appreciate the Philosophy of Śrī Jīva and divert our desires and passions towards the infinitely relishable all-merciful Kriṣṇa with full knowledge that Kriṣṇa is the dearest to us.

After long many years of activities, the philosopher cum religious teacher left this mundane plane for his eternal abode — the eternal Vrindāvan.

Dulal Chandra Ghosh

PRESIDENCY COLLEGE, CALCUTTA
15th August, 1974

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PART I
ORIENTATION

VAIṢṆAVA VEDĀNTA

The Philosophy of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī

INTRODUCTION

When Professor Whitehead says that the "general characteristic of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato,"¹ he, of course, uses the word "footnote" as a metaphor, since we all know that there are a good many European philosophers, dead and alive, from the great Stagyrīte to Bertrand Russell who are fundamentally in disagreement with Plato. But when it is said that all Indian philosophies are but a series of footnotes to the Upaniṣads, the term "footnotes" need not be taken in a metaphorical sense, since what is stated is a fact literally true, which no philosopher of India would ever deny. One can say, and very justly, that the philosophy of India has been written once and for all by the seers of the Upaniṣads. And this is so because of the fact that the Upaniṣads are the spontaneous expressions of the deepest intuitions of the ancient sages and not dry fabrication of purely discursive intellect. Like the expressions of profound aesthetic and mystic intuitions, the texts of the Upaniṣads embody experiences which are flexible, free, and broad. Thus they have remained the inexhaustible source of information and inspiration, profoundly rich in their suggestiveness and implications, for the use of the philosophers throughout the ages.

Results of purely intellectual gymnastics are generally finished products, cut and dried. They have nothing more to them when once understood; they leave no mystery when once analyzed; whereas the free expressions of intuitions, sensuous, aesthetic, romantic, mystic, of whatever type may be, are elusive; they never can be grasped in their completeness; they never can be stabilized by the categories of thought—an irrational surd, a residue, a mystery is always left over. This is the

¹A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), p. 63.

reason why they continue to be the unfathomable fountainhead of suggestions for all time and to all seekers who know how to unlock the mystery. Such are the Upaniṣads of the early Hindus.

Vedānta philosophy, literally "the end of the wisdom-teaching," is the name given to the essential purport of the principal Upaniṣads that were brought out and systematized in five hundred and fifty-five aphorisms attributed to the sage Bādarāyana. Being written in aphoristic form, this work of great veneration had to be commented upon. Dozens of commentaries have been written upon these aphorisms by the foremost thinkers of the country. Judging from the standpoint of originality, depth, and their bearings on the religion and culture of India, the commentaries of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Mādhva, Ballava, Nimbārka and Baladeva are regarded as of highest importance and greatest influence. All these philosophers and their disciples are called Vedāntists. Their philosophies are embodied mainly in their commentaries and super commentaries and in other original works which they produced. Another ancient work of profound philosophic value is known as Bhagavad Gītā, the Song Celestial, as it has been called. It forms a part of the great epic Mahābhārata. The Gītā attempted to bring about a very thorough synthesis of the existing Upaniṣads of the time. This book has attracted the interest of the philosophers as much as have the aphorisms of the Vedānta. Almost all of the great Vedāntists have some commentary on this little book of seven hundred stanzas.

Apart from the Vedānta philosophy, there exist other systems of thought, such as Sāṅkhya, Yoga, Nyāya. These systems of thought are not in any sense in serious disagreement with the Vedānta. An attempt has been made to bring about a synthesis of all the systems of thought by the Purāṇas, literally, ancient truths. They are semi-philosophical works. There are eighteen of them, attributed by tradition to one person, Vyāsa. The most outstanding of these Purāṇas is the Śrīmad Bhāgavata which itself is considered as a commentary of the Vedānta. In this book have been fused all the great systems of Hindu philosophic thought with wonderful genius and skill. This book commands, perhaps, the combined veneration that the Christians cherish for the New Testament and the Platonists for Plato's dialogues. What is meant is that it is a work of both religious

and philosophical value. Those who are especially influenced by this book commonly go by the name Bhāgavata or Vaiṣṇav. Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī whose philosophy we are about to study in this paper is one among those Bhāgavatas who wrote illuminating commentaries on this book of great veneration and left immortal contributions to posterity. The overwhelming tendency on the part of the Indian philosophers for writing commentaries and commentaries on commentaries is to be explained by the fact that they wanted to contribute their thoughts to one common fund of their culture. No one intended to make a fresh start like Bacon or Descartes, decrying all the past tradition as "idols". No great philosopher has lived on the soil of India who did not have profound respect for his tradition and who did not enrich his tradition profoundly by his contributions, mostly in the form of commentaries.

In the pages that follow, I shall try to consider the metaphysics of Vedānta in general and the contributions of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī in particular. My attempt may be compared to that of one who would try to write the philosophy of Neo-platonism with special reference to Proclus. Such a person would have to make a very general survey of the philosophy of the Platonic dialogues and then through Plotinus arrive at Proclus. Here, in an analogous fashion, I intend to write about the general ontological position of the Upaniṣads, which is virtually the metaphysics of Vedānta, and after a brief review of the approach of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, consider the philosophy of Śrī Jīva Gosvāmī. It has already been remarked that the groundwork of the Vedānta was laid by the Upaniṣads. The ontology of the Upaniṣads, therefore, constitutes the background of all the Vedāntists, including Śrī Jīva. We shall therefore start with the general metaphysical position of the Vedānta. This will also acquaint us with the background on which Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Śrī Jīva worked in common with all Vedāntists. Next we consider the contributions of the two great predecessors of Śrī Jīva, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. These two Vedāntists are to Śrī Jīva what Aristotle and Augustine are to Thomas Aquinas. In our account of Śrī Jīva we shall first consider his general position in relation to his ontological background of the Upaniṣads and next the synthesis he attempted between the two opposing views of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Lastly, we shall include four sections on theology, psychology, cosmology, and

ethics of Śrī Jīva and his school. These four fields are, however, traditionally treated: Śrī Jīva's philosophy simply gave them a new colouring. Posterity developed a new outlook towards these fields owing to his contribution. It is this, I believe, that constitutes one of the major contributions of a philosopher in relation to a culture as a whole. Not a radical change of tradition but a new outlook, more systematic, more thorough and more integrated with the needs and demands of the time, is what mankind owes to the philosophers. This may not and need not be the immediate aim of the philosopher; but this is what his work amounts to for posterity as it appears in the perspective of history. If this be so, Śrī Jīva occupies a great place in the history of thought.

My sole aim is to present the subject with all possible presuppositions and implications. The exposition is primarily historical. Attempts, however, have been made to make it logical as well but that does not mean there is any intention to defend the position presented. Usually Indian philosophers are quoted to substantiate and Western philosophers are quoted to clarify the subject under discussion. If at times polemical language is used to criticize or reject any aspect of Western thought it is done in sympathy with the particular point that happens to be under consideration so that European and American students may better understand this unknown subject in terms with which they are well acquainted.

CHAPTER I

ONTOLOGY

Vedāntic Ontology

The first and the last court of appeal in the Vedānta philosophy is experience (*anubhava*). With experience it begins, with experience it ends. Experience is synonymous with reality, which is to be analyzed, synthesized and plunged into, so that its ultimate nature may be immediately apprehended.

What is experience? Experience is consciousness (*caitanya*) answers the Vedāntist. The two are identical. "I experience" means I am conscious. Consciousness is, in the language of Kant, "the lawgiver of nature."¹ For the Vedāntist it is consciousness that makes experience. Experience goes to pieces without consciousness. The essential factor that makes experience what it is, and without which it is next to nothing, is consciousness. Consciousness, therefore, is the essence of reality.

Consciousness is reality since reality to a Vedāntist is that which cannot be denied. Consciousness is just that. Its very denial presupposes its existence. Its "essence" in the language of Spinoza, "involves existence."² Śāṅkara says:

The existence of *Brahman* (absolute reality) is known on the ground of its being the self of every one. For every one is conscious of the existence of his self and never thinks 'I am not'. If the existence of the self was not known everyone would think 'I am not'.³

It cannot be denied since the denier himself is that consciousness.

Experience without consciousness is for the Vedāntist a meaningless term. He would contend that in order to be something existent, manifold of sensation or a thing-in-itself or something unknown and unknowable or even nothing that what is

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. F. Max Mullar (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922), p. 103.

² Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. R. H. M. Elews (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1933), p. 1, 39.

³ Śāṅkara, "Bhāṣya" 1.1.1, *Sacred Books of the East*, trans. F. Max Muller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), XXXIV, 14.

in question must be the object of some awareness however paradoxical this may appear.

There is an eternal connection between my self and the world, because this world has its other side in my consciousness. If there were no conscious being and no supreme consciousness at its source and centre there could not be a world.¹

Everything can be denied save consciousness. The famous statement of Descartes "*Cogito, ergo sum*" indeed expresses a deep truth. It requires consciousness to doubt or deny consciousness and hence it is undeniable. The very essence of reality, therefore, is consciousness. A short dialogue between two philosophers of the Upaniṣads illustrates this position of the Vedāntist very clearly.

King Janaka asked Yājñavalkya what was the light of man. Yājñavalkya first said that the light of man was the sun. It is on account of the sun that man is able to sit and move about, to go forth for work and return. 'When the sun has set, O Yājñavalkya,' asked King Janaka, 'what is the light of man?' Yājñavalkya said that then the moon was the light of man. For, having the moon for light man could sit and move about and do his work and return. 'When both the sun and the moon have set,' asked King Janaka, 'what is the light of man?' 'Fire, indeed,' said Yājñavalkya, 'is man's light, for having fire for his light man can sit and move about, do his work and return.' 'When the sun has set, when the moon has set, and when the fire is extinguished what is the light of man?' asked Janaka. 'Now, verily,' says Yājñavalkya, 'you are pressing me to the deepest question. When the sun has set, when the moon has set and when the fire is extinguished the self alone is man's light.'²

Consciousness and that alone is real. Consciousness (*caitanya*) is identical with existence (*sat*). The whole of existence is consciousness and their unity is called bliss (*ānanda*). "My consciousness and the vast world outside me are one. And

¹ Rabindranath Tagore, *Personality* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1917), p. 186.

² *Bṛihadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, iv. 3. 2-6, quoted from R. D. Ranade, *A Constructive Survey of Upaniṣadic Philosophy* (Poona : Oriental Book Agency, 1926).

where is that Unity? It is that Great Power, who breathes out Consciousness in me and also in the world outside myself."¹ How Consciousness can be the whole of existence and what their identity means we shall grasp fully when we have acquainted ourselves with consciousness in all its dimensions. Consciousness has four dimensions in Vedāntā philosophy, and when it has all of them it is said to be full and blissful. To these four dimensions of consciousness we now turn our attention.

DIMENSIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

First Dimension—"WAKING".—Ordinarily when we think of conscious experience we look around us at sensible objects, including our own bodies. It is with these immediately perceived objects that we equate our conscious experience. We think of it, to use a spatial metaphor, as an extended plane. This is said to be the first dimension of consciousness. It is the sensible corporeal world. As there are four dimensions and all the others are approached only through this it is called the first.²

When we stop to analyze a moment we discover that our percepts have hardly any meaning without concepts or ideas. In order to be conscious of a red rose, for instance, one has to borrow numerous ideas from one's earlier memories. Mere percepts give very little. Thus we begin to realize that consciousness has not only length and breadth but depth too. To a Vedāntist consciousness is solid, so to speak, or even more than solid; a solid has three dimensions while Vedāntic consciousness has four. Psychologists tell us that mind is like an iceberg only one-ninth of which is floating on the surface. By four dimensions the Vedāntists seek to encompass the whole consciousness. Those dimensions are named as follows : (1) Waking consciousness (*jāgrat*), (2) Dream consciousness (*svapna*), (3) Dreamless consciousness (*susupti*), (4) The Fourth consciousness (*turiya*), so-called perhaps for want of a technical term, although in course of time the term "Fourth" acquired a technical status. We shall capitalize these four terms in order to indicate their technical meaning.

¹ Tagore, *op. cit.*

² *Vide Śaṅkara, Commentary on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, trans. M. N. Dvivedi (Theosophical Publication, Bombay, 1894), p. 7.

The first dimension as we have already mentioned is the corporeal sensible world which is technically called "Waking". "Waking has its experience limited to the gross plane and its fruition therefore consists of gross objects. It is named *vaiśvānara*, which is a collective name of all beings on the gross plane."¹

In spite of such names as "Waking" or "Dream" it should not be supposed that this is a mere psychological study of the mind. The dimensions are so named not because they are psychological but because they have been discovered through psychological analysis. That they are preeminently ontological, we shall see as we proceed.

Second dimension—"DREAMING"—The second dimension is called "Dream" consciousness. Dreams are studied by our psychologists today usually to satisfy their curiosity about the psyche. Psychologists are not interested in the metaphysical implications of dreams. Our metaphysicians also neglect them for no good reason. If our waking consciousness does supply us with materials that enable us to philosophize, there is no reason why the dreaming and dreamless states of our existence should not also do so, says a Vedāntist. Dreams or dreamless sleep are nothing abnormal. Every sane person sleeps daily; some nights he dreams; some nights he sleeps soundly without any dream. As a matter of fact, we spend almost one-third of our life in dreaming and while dreaming, dreams are no more dreams than waking perceptions are dreams. They appear as equally real. To a Vedāntist, however, these aspects of human experience reveal different dimensions of consciousness and consequently of existence, since they are two sides of one reality like two faces of one piece of paper.² A psychologist's account of a dream is somewhat like this: when a man goes to sleep he sees images, some of which are due to an actual external stimulus, present at the time of sleep, while others are the copies of his waking perceptions arising spontaneously and at random. Now let us see how a Vedāntist would distinguish his dreaming states from his waking ones.

Waking experiences are restricted to the actual presentative elements whereas dreams are not. Waking consciousness

¹ *Ibid.*

² D. N. Tagore, *Gītā pāṭha* (Allahabad: Indian Press, 1926), p. 301.

is directed by practical interests whereas dreams are not. A continuously connective attention gives waking states a more definite pattern than the dream images. Free play of imagination gives the dream a wider scope and flexibility than the waking states. The connections that are contradictory and impossible in waking states are quite commonplace in dreams. Our practical needs of life have a very commanding voice in our waking consciousness. This is selective and gives rise to beliefs and prejudices which rule out certain associations. In waking states certain things demand more attention than others. Certain objects we are serious about, others we pass by, and these choices are mostly determined by the biological drives of our life. In dreams, on the other hand, while our biological demands are at their minimum the tyranny of practical needs ceases for a moment to exorcise the function of our free mind. The images find an unfenced field in which to play freely. Perhaps we see our own ideas, but they are not known to be *our* ideas. They seem to be as much "given" as the objects of waking life. The waking life is presented with a real given and the dream life with a *belief* that something is given. The real given also involves belief, but that it is more than belief and that the belief of the dream is *mere* belief is not known until the two beliefs are taken together and compared. Justly or not our waking experience is regulated by a sense of uniformity, continuity, and limitation of space and time. But utter discontinuity, lack of uniformity, and absence of space-time reference seem to characterize the dream state. To be sure, the dreams too appear to take place in space and time and to possess some pattern, but what is altogether lost is their rigidity. "There is no tyrannic continuous memory, no rigid demand for uniformity, no compunction for not being in a line with truth—a glorious life of thoughtless thoughtfulness."¹ Such are dreams. What do they indicate to a Vedāntist?

Dream states signify to the Vedāntist that there is the possibility of "perception without sensation," since dreams are just such perception. What of it? we ask. Granting that it is so, what metaphysical import does it have? It suggests, answers a Vedāntist, that there is the possibility of a realm of pure ideas and meanings which are not limited by impressions. There is

¹ K. C. Bhaṭṭācārya, *Studies in Vedāntism* (Calcutta University, 1909), p. 2.

a world of thoughts, of ideas ; and there consciousness is free of externalities. This is the more intimate nature of our consciousness, since here it exhibits its freedom and spontaneity. "Internal perception is prior to external logically if not chronologically."¹ The world of sensation appears to be real to us only because it is sustained and given meanings by ideas and thoughts. "The sensation is felt to give us reality only because the idea unconsciously animates it."² Is perception, apart from thought, experience at all ? Emphatically not. It is with thought, with judgment, that our knowledge truly begins and not with mere presentation. What makes perception feel real to me is my interpretation of it, and this interpretation is preeminently an act of thought. Presentation is representative, and hence thought is more fundamental and basic than sense. It is this realm of free thought that constitutes the second dimension of consciousness. If we have to know reality, we have to know it more from thoughts than from sense. This is the lesson of the dream. Professor Bhaṭṭācārya writes :

Sensation and idea are not co-ordinate in reality and to overlook this is a fundamental vice of Empirical psychology. The idea may unconsciously animate the sensation (perception is a 'presentative-representative' cognition) but this unconscious working is absolutely different from its conscious existence. The conscious idea, while recognizing itself to have been operative in the percept, absolutely disowns its unconscious sensuous character, *e.g.*, when an illusion is corrected by careful observation, the idea stimulating a percept is known to be a *mere* idea, but the illusory percept vanishes altogether without caring to court a comparison with the true percept. Thus we have three distinct mental states throwing light on one another : (1) perception in which ideas unconsciously work, (2) such perceptions coexisting with a conscious idea, where the idea is regarded as inferior in reality to the percept and (3) the pure idea, hardly ever realized in waking consciousness (except probably in the fluid transparency of the poet's intuition in spontaneous clairvoyance, or in the settled vision of the Yogin) to which the waking world would appear unsubstantial. The last state is one to which all have not

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

² *Ibid.*, p. 4.

access, and would be disbelieved altogether, were it not for the fact that we have a daily illustration of its *possibility* in our dreams. In dreams, the ideas do not consciously remember the corresponding waking percepts, they are at once percepts.¹

What has been said does not however mean that dreams as such are more real than waking life. Dreams only suggest the *possibility* of such power of consciousness as has to be utilized and delved into in reflection, introspection and abstract thinking. In the language of Plato, "And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure—when she has as little as possible to do with body and has no bodily sense or feeling but is aspiring after being."² Into this realm of consciousness we have access only to the degree that we have been able to free ourselves from the needs of the body. In dreams the body is reduced to a minimum, and so the lesson that it gives us is that the more successful we are in reducing our practical demands, the more shall we see into the depth of reality and make our consciousness free. Our speculative aspirations approximate their goal when they are not tied to practical considerations but have learned to transcend them. From Aristotle and also from the forest-dwelling philosophers of India we have learned that philosophy is the result of leisure hours, when biological demands are either minimized or satisfied (if that is possible). Dreams themselves may be utterly useless, but their teaching is of supreme value. They tell us, to sum up, that could we once minimize all the persistent and sometimes tyrannical demands of our body and be forgetful of it as we are in sleep, and at the same time *possess ourselves* and not lose control as we do in sleep, we would have a more complete and comprehensive vision of truth. The most valuable things of which human culture today has reason to be proud seem to be in proportion to this ideal, namely the ideal of negating body and asserting idea.

The experiences of the states of dreams is called *Taijasa*, because, it being entirely of the essence of light be-

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

² Plato, *Phaedo* 656, trans. B. Jowett (New York : Charles Scriber's Sons, 1891), I, 391.

comes the cognizer of the mind, irrespective of the objective. The experience of this condition is therefore rightly called experience of the subtle.¹

This is the second dimension of reality.

Third dimension—"DREAMLESSNESS".—Next we try to fathom the third stratum of consciousness which lies one layer deeper than thought. We have reached the realm of ideas, of concepts. But a single isolated concept is almost nothing. It is no thought at all. Thoughts are judgments. Concepts therefore appear and disappear in clusters and not in isolation. They always present themselves in groups, and they seem to be tied together by a sort of internal bond. They may be two, three or more in number, in every case they are in a system. Within the system they take up various forms. Kant has told us of twelve categories, although they do not all appear together. Pāṇini, the old grammarian-philosopher tells us that six such concepts may appear clustered on one single judgment, fastened by one relation. Take for instance : on the sacrificial ground in the evening Rāma, the son of Daśaratha, with his own hand is giving alms from the treasury to the poor. Here by a single relation of giving, Rāma, alms, hand, poor, treasury, sacrificial ground, and evening; agent, patient, object, instrument, source, space, and time are held together. This is one judgment or thought. What holds this judgment and the divergent factors together? The factors are concepts. They spring up from somewhere and arrange themselves in a pattern. Whence do they come, whither do they disappear? Why do they form one pattern rather than another? All this suggests a background from where they rise and to which they return and which accounts for their pattern, something that gives them unity, keeps them in shape and order. The soaring imagination, the deepening reflection, the penetrative introspection, these are all players. They require a stage and a stagemaster to import rhyme and reason to them, to make their relationship possible and meaningful, rather than chaotic. In one word, thoughts, concepts, categories need, to use a Kantian phrase, a synthetic unity, in order to be what they are.

Let us look at the picture from a somewhat different angle. Whenever there is thought, there is a thinker. Whether in

¹ Śaṅkara, *Bhāṣya on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, trans. M. N. Dvivedi (Theosophical Publication, Bombay, 1894), pp. 9-10.

sense experience and the thoughts of waking life or in a free play of images in dream experience, a knower and a known are indispensable for any experience, actual or possible. Why do the subject and object coexist? What accounts for their close bonds? Their relationship cannot be accidental since it is universal. All knowledge involves the subject-object relationship. It therefore cannot be that subject and object just happen to come together. Their inseparability is so real that they appear like twin sons of one mother. They are two aspects of one reality that includes them. That underlying reality cannot be any object of thought, since in all thought it is presupposed. It therefore transcends thought and at the same time embraces the two relata, knower and known, that are bifurcated within it.

If experience is allowed to speak for itself it will tell us that subject and object are presented as one. Knowledge becomes intelligible when we recognize that the fundamental relation in all conscious experience is a relation of members which are in an organic unity which exist as terms, is a living process in and through each other, or in and through a universal which transcends them both, though it does not exclude them.¹

Thus through two paths we have come to the postulation of another level of consciousness, which is the synthetic unity of all relations, of the ideal realm in general and of the knower-known relation in particular, and which at the same time transcends them all.

But, after all, this is an hypothesis. We have no right to assert it as an existential reality and term it as a level of consciousness. Undoubtedly so. And this is the reason why Kant does not assert it as existential. The Vedāntist is well aware of this and he would not affirm the existence of a hypothetical principle however reasonable it might be, until somewhere it is experienced, and something in experience positively guarantees its existence.

Wherein lies the importance of dreamless sleep for a Vedāntist? Some nights we sleep very soundly and do not dream at all. In dreams we have perception without sensation, thoughts without things; in dreamless sleep we have an experience without any content, a knowledge without any thought.

¹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (The Macmillan Co., 1927), II, 305.

A question might possibly be asked : Why call dreamless sleep knowledge without thought? Is it knowledge at all? In dreamless sleep we have simply no experience. To call it an experience without content is just playing with words. We first answer by a counter question. How do you know that you had no experience? Does a color-blind person know that he does not see certain colors? He simply has no experience of that particular color, but he cannot be aware of his non-awareness by any effort of his own except from memory if some time in his early years he was not a color-blind man. In order to know that one had absence of awareness in dreamless sleep, some awareness of his must be present there. It would possibly be urged that one can easily infer it in the morning from the envining circumstances and freshness of his mind. This, we say, is not possible unless one has actual experience. In order to have a valid conclusion, such as "experience was contentless" from a syllogism, one must require some middle term "M" which should be distributed in at least one premise. If "M" is distributed in the premise in which "experience" occurs, then "M" should have to be included in experience. In that case "M" will be the content of experience which is against the desired conclusion unless "M" is null. To admit that "M" is null is to say that there is no middle term and hence no syllogism—a fact which is not desired because what is desired by the opponent is to prove that it is valid inference. If, on the other hand, "M" is distributed in the premise in which "experience" does not occur then "experience" has to be included in "M". But nothing can include experience unless it is an experience itself. The syllogism is therefore valid only when "M" is an experience. Hence Q. E. D. There can be a valid inference whose conclusion is that "experience was contentless" only when there is another experience "m" which includes as its content the experience which was contentless. The inference then simply proves that what is thus proven namely "the experience was contentless" is not an inference but a fact of previous experience, that is to say, a fact of memory. In other words, there cannot be a valid conclusion such as "experience was contentless" unless there is a middle term which is either the object or subject of that experience. That experience has no object according to the hypothesis and hence it has a subject, a knower if the inference is valid. But in that case that the

experience was contentless is itself no inference but a fact of memory.

Or, let us put it psychologically. We cannot infer anything in the world that was not somehow or somewhere presented. Non-existence of any object during deep sleep has to be given as a fact experienced somehow and sometime. It does not improve the situation a bit when one argues that one had no object of experience because one feels refreshed, unless feeling refreshed and having no object of experience are sometimes given related together. Therefore when in the morning, one says that one had sound sleep last night and had no dreams, one says it from memory and not from inference. To concede that it is memory is to admit that there was a consciousness which did no sleep but was aware of the non-existence of any thought. And hence dreamless sleep proves the existence of knowledge without thought. Suppose one is sitting in a very dark room. In order to know that he is in a dark room, he must have some consciousness which need not necessarily be the consciousness of the darkness but must be consciousness of himself at any rate. As long as he knows he is there he knows he is in darkness. He would not know that there was no light in the room if he himself were asleep. A sleepless consciousness that knows itself should be there in order to witness darkness. And this also justifies the statement of Yājñavalkya, the Upaniṣadic philosopher who said that "when the sun sets, the moon sets, the fire is extinguished, self is the light of Man."

The above argument should not be considered fallacious on the assumption that it commits the fallacy of "*argumentum ad ignorantiam*". That fallacy is committed when one seeks to prove something merely by showing that its absence cannot be proved. In the above case, we are proving the existence of knowledge, not disproving the absence of knowledge, by proving the presence of the knowledge of "absence of knowledge". It is held that presence of knowledge is necessary to be aware of "absence of knowledge" as much as it is necessary to be aware of any other object. And that presence of the "absence of knowledge" is proved by the memory that one has when one gets up in the morning. In the morning I *remember* that "I was in a sound sleep and did not know anything." This fact of "not-knowing anything" requires the presence of a consciousness to witness. It is only in syllogistic reasoning that *argu-*